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ARTICLES 
 
The Roots of Removal* 
Debra Lyn Bassett† 
Rex R. Perschbacher‡ 
 Academic observers of federal litigation generally describe the field by 
reference to its constitutional and statutory foundations. Also at play 
within this landscape are powerful normative policy elements 
recognized by scholars and practitioners—at least implicitly—as 
essential to an adequate description of the litigation choices available 
to the participants. One of these policy features is the oft-repeated 
maxim that the plaintiff is the master of the claim. Although this basic 
premise quietly dominates both academic discussions and practice 
realities, a number of factors operate to impose very real limitations on 
that principle. These limitations, in turn, shape how we approach 
federal litigation and include, specifically, how we approach federal 
court jurisdiction. One of these limitations on a plaintiff’s power that 
implicates federal jurisdiction is removal—and removal provides an 
instructive example of the exceptionally rich environment where policy 
elements interact with constitutional and statutory features. Removal 
is a means of moving a state court lawsuit into federal court, and 
approximately thirty thousand civil cases are transferred in this 
manner annually. Through removal, under certain circumstances, a 
defendant is able to defeat the plaintiff’s choice of forum. Thus, 
removal inherently raises questions about what limitations should be 
placed on a plaintiff’s choice of forum. These questions have been 
answered in different ways depending on the specific issue and the 
timing, which includes both the historical context and the litigation 
point in time. Three particular aspects of removal law illustrate the 
dramatic way in which these differences unfold. As a general matter, 
when removal occurs at the very outset of a lawsuit, the procedures are 
quite straightforward. However, removal instituted after the initial 
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thirty-day removal period raises more issues and has the potential to 
become more complicated. Three of the most difficult issues in removal 
law arise in such a subsequently instituted removal context—the first- 
(versus last-) served defendant rule, the voluntary-involuntary rule, 
and the one-year limitation for removing diversity cases. Courts and 
commentators typically have discussed these issues separately, without 
realizing that these issues share an underlying commonality that 
yields a surprisingly effective analytical framework: the inherent 
tension between deferring to the plaintiff’s choice of forum versus the 
defendant’s right of removal.  
INTRODUCTION 
The law of removal is a study in contradictions. The 
United States Constitution expressly authorizes arising-under 
and diversity jurisdiction,1 without mentioning removal. Yet 
removal is regularly classified as one of the bases for federal court 
subject-matter jurisdiction. Because removal is a procedure 
rather than a true form of jurisdiction, the Constitution makes no 
direct mention of removing cases from state court to federal 
court.2 However, the U.S. legal landscape has included removal 
since the creation of federal courts; the First Congress enacted 
removal procedures in the first Judiciary Act of 1789.3 This gives 
removal a unique place in federal court jurisprudence—a 
statutory regime of quasi-constitutional character. 
At the same time, removal runs directly contrary to one 
of the most deeply embedded, yet implicit, maxims of United 
States adversarial procedure: the plaintiff is the master of his 
or her claim.4 The unresolved and ongoing tension between 
  
 1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 2 See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3721 (4th ed. 2009) (“The right to remove a case from a state court to a 
federal court is purely statutory . . . .”); see also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 304, 349 (1816) (“This power of removal is not to be found in express terms in 
any part of the constitution . . . .”). 
 3 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79; 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 2, § 3721.  
 4 Despite the lack of scholarly commentary, those who are involved in the 
practice of law in this country, and those of us teaching it, each accept the baseline norm 
that among the choices available by law, plaintiffs have the initial choice of judicial 
system (federal or state depending upon the limits of subject-matter jurisdiction), the 
parties who will join as plaintiffs, the parties to be named as defendants (assuming 
personal jurisdiction is available for court process to reach them), and the place of trial 
(venue). This plaintiff-choice system has been acknowledged by no less than the U.S. 
Supreme Court. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 242 (1982); Hoffman v. 
Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960). Moreover, plaintiffs are able to take advantage of any 
jurisdiction in which the action can be brought and where the statute of limitations 
against the plaintiff’s claim has not run, even if only one such state remains. See Keeton 
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80 (1984). 
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these two concepts—that of the defendant’s right to remove 
versus the plaintiff as master of the claim—continues to be 
seen in court decisions characterizing the defendant’s ability to 
remove as inferior to the plaintiff’s choice of forum.5  
Despite the continuing debate over the historical 
purpose of diversity jurisdiction6 and the paucity of historical 
documentation,7 the theories as to diversity’s purpose originate 
in the concept of local bias or prejudice.8 Diversity offers a rich 
context in the conflict between removal, a defendant’s tool, and 
the plaintiff’s traditional role as master of the claim.  
Strict application of the rule that gives plaintiffs 
absolute mastery of the litigation would allow plaintiffs, but 
not defendants, the right to choose to invoke federal diversity 
jurisdiction in qualifying cases and avoid the dangers of local 
bias, or nevertheless to select the state forum and its attendant 
risks of local bias. Defendants would simply have to live with 
the plaintiff’s forum (and other) choices. Removal provides a 
significant counterbalance. Rather than according the plaintiff 
exclusive control over the choice between a federal forum versus 
a state forum, as would be consistent with the “plaintiff as 
master of the claim” maxim, the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided 
for removal, which expressly permits a defendant to defeat the 
plaintiff’s forum choice. The original draft bill authorized 
  
 5 See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 219 n.11 (5th Cir. 
1998) (“The defendant’s right to remove and the plaintiff’s right to choose the forum are 
not equal . . . .” (quoting 16 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
§ 107.05 (3d ed. 1997)), rev’d, 526 U.S. 574 (1999); Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 
167 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (“The plaintiff’s right to choose his forum 
is superior to the defendant’s right of removal.”).  
 6 Compare Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938) (“Diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent apprehended discrimination in 
state courts against those not citizens of the state.”), with Henry J. Friendly, The Historic 
Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 496-97 (1928) (“The desire to 
protect creditors against legislation favorable to debtors was a principal reason for the 
grant of diversity jurisdiction.”); see also 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601, at 13, 15 (3d ed. 2009) (noting “the traditional 
explanation, and the one most often cited by federal judges and legal scholars, of the 
purpose of the constitutional provision for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and its 
immediate congressional implementation—the fear that state courts would be prejudiced 
against out-of-state litigants”). But see id. § 3601, at 15-16 (“Several historians have 
suggested . . . that the real fear . . . was not of the state courts, but of the state 
legislatures . . . . The fear of state legislatures may have arisen less from interstate 
hostility than from a desire to protect commercial interests from class bias.”). 
 7 See Friendly, supra note 6, at 484-85 (noting that diversity jurisdiction 
“had not bulked large” in the eyes of the Constitution’s framers, “[n]or are the records 
of the Convention fruitful to a student of the diversity clause”). See generally Debra 
Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 119, 122-36 
(2003) (providing historical background of diversity jurisdiction).  
 8 Bassett, supra note 7, at 119-32. 
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removal of any lawsuit for which diversity jurisdiction existed;9 
the final version authorized removal only when the plaintiff filed 
suit in her home state against an out-of-state defendant.10  
The Supreme Court weighed in early on removal and 
supported removal in no uncertain terms, expressly rejecting 
any contention that only the plaintiff’s forum choice was 
entitled to protection: 
The [C]onstitution of the United States was designed for the common 
and equal benefit of all the people of the United States. The judicial 
power was granted for the same benign and salutary purposes. It 
was not to be exercised exclusively for the benefit of parties who 
might be plaintiffs, and would elect the national forum, but also for 
the protection of defendants who might be entitled to try their 
rights, or assert their privileges, before the same forum. . . . [A]s the 
plaintiff may always elect the state court, the defendant may be 
deprived of all the security which the constitution intended in aid of 
his rights. Such a state of things can, in no respect, be considered as 
giving equal rights. To obviate this difficulty, we are referred to the 
power which it is admitted congress possess to remove suits from 
state courts to the national courts . . . .11  
The view that a defendant’s right of removal has equal 
stature and the same constitutional dimension as a plaintiff’s 
right to select the forum12 runs contrary to the plaintiff as 
master of the claim maxim, because removal’s very purpose lies 
in defeating the plaintiff’s choice of forum. However, this 
should not be seen as surprising, given the number of 
limitations on the plaintiff as master of the claim principle, 
both within and without the removal context.13  
  
 9 Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 90-91 (1923).  
 10 Id. at 91; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80 (authorizing 
the removal of any action “commenced in any state court against an alien, or by a 
citizen of the state in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another state, and 
[where] the matter in dispute exceeds the aforesaid sum or value of five hundred 
dollars, exclusive of costs”).  
 11 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348-49 (1816).  
 12 See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cody, 166 U.S. 606, 609 (1897) (referring to 
“defendant’s constitutional right as a citizen of a different state than the plaintiff, to 
choose a federal forum”); Boatmen’s Bank of St. Louis v. Fritzlen, 135 F. 650, 655 (8th 
Cir. 1905) (stating that a defendant’s right of removal “is of sufficient value and gravity 
to be guarantied by the Constitution and the acts of Congress”); In re Diet Drugs Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 414, 425 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (stating that a defendant’s right 
of removal “emanates from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution”).  
 13 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)-(b) (2006) (authorizing motions for change of 
venue, through which a party may transfer an action to a different federal judicial district 
from that where the plaintiff originally filed the suit); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. 
Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005) (despite plaintiff’s election to sue in state 
court on a state law–based claim, defendant permitted to remove on the basis of arising 
under jurisdiction because the case raised a contested and substantial federal question 
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In yet another element of removal’s contradictory 
nature, the popular maxim that the courts must construe the 
removal statutes strictly does not alter this interpretation. A 
strict construction of the removal statutes does not suggest a 
bias against removal, nor does it restore the plaintiff as master 
of the claim to a superior position. Supreme Court case law 
indicates that the strict construction approach has nothing to 
do with subjugating defendants or elevating plaintiffs but 
instead has everything to do with basic concepts of federalism,14 
and thus actions should be removed from state court 
jurisdiction only to the extent authorized by federal statute.15  
When removal comes within the statutory authority of 
28 U.S.C. § 1441, the general removal statute, by definition the 
suit is one in which the federal and state courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction, so the federal and state courts have 
overlapping authority.16 This concurrent power means that 
removal does not offend the dignity of state judiciaries unless, 
again, the plaintiff as master of the claim is superior to a 
defendant’s right to remove—and thus removal serves to 
circumvent the state court’s superior claim to adjudicate the 
case. This position cannot prevail in a legal regime that allows 
removal in order to defeat the plaintiff’s choice of forum under 
  
that the federal court could hear “without disturbing any congressionally approved 
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities”); Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 
539 U.S. 1 (2003) (despite plaintiff’s election to sue in state court on a state law based 
claim, federal preemption of state law resulted in recharacterization of plaintiff’s claim); 
Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981) (stating that although 
the plaintiff had pleaded his claim solely in terms of state law, “at least some of the 
claims had a sufficient federal character to support removal”). 
 14 See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) (stating, 
in the removal context, that “[t]he power reserved to the states under the Constitution 
to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts, may be restricted only 
by the action of Congress in conformity to the Judiciary Articles of the Constitution. 
‘Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate 
federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the 
precise limits which the statute has defined.’” (citations omitted)). 
 15 Shamrock Oil has been cited for the proposition that a plaintiff’s right to 
select the forum is superior to the defendant’s right to removal. See, e.g., Auchinleck v. 
Town of LaGrange, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (citing Shamrock Oil 
as authority in stating that “[t]he plaintiff’s right to choose his forum is superior to the 
defendant’s right of removal”); see also In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 270 
F. Supp. 2d 357, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Shamrock Oil for “the right of plaintiffs to 
choose the forum in which to bring suit”). But Shamrock Oil said no such thing. Indeed, 
Shamrock Oil merely held that a plaintiff cannot remove a state court lawsuit to 
federal court on the basis of a counterclaim. See Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 106-07.  
 16 See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM 189 (2010) (noting that concurrent powers between the federal government 
and the states refers “to a structure in which multiple levels of government within a 
single polity possess[] overlapping authority to regulate, legislate, or adjudicate”). 
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specified circumstances. As expressed by one commentator, 
“Stating that a plaintiff has a superior ‘right’ to select a forum 
is merely an unsupported claim, not a self-evident fact.”17  
The concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state 
courts where removal is properly invoked, removal’s history, 
and the statutory authorization of removal all serve to reduce 
the plaintiff’s power. “Master of the claim” becomes the 
minimalist axiom that the plaintiff chooses the initial court in 
which to file the claim subject, whenever federal jurisdiction is 
available, to the defendant’s right to rely on the removal 
statutes’ authority. The defendant’s right to remove does, and 
should, rightfully defeat the plaintiff’s selected forum.  
Removal is a popular procedure, transferring 
approximately thirty thousand cases annually out of state 
courts and into federal courts.18 When a plaintiff files a civil 
lawsuit in state court, federal statutes authorize the defendant 
to remove the suit from the state court to federal court under 
certain specified circumstances and pursuant to specified 
procedures.19 The basic removal provisions, especially for 
lawsuits that involve a single defendant, are relatively 
straightforward and unremarkable. Only a defendant can 
remove,20 and a defendant can only effect removal from a state 
court to a federal court.21 The federal court to which the lawsuit 
is removed must be the federal court for the district and 
division encompassing the state court.22 As is true for any 
lawsuit that seeks to proceed in federal court, the action must 
  
 17 Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 
609, 638 (2004).  
 18 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 50 tbl.S-7 (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversio
n.pdf (reflecting that 30,161—approximately 11%—of the total filings in federal district 
courts were removals). 
 19 The basic removal provisions are those governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 
1446, and 1447 (2006). There are other removal statutes that govern specialized 
circumstances. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (modifying removal provisions for certain 
class actions pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005). 
 20 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (specifically referring to defendants); Chi., R.I. & 
P.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 580 (1954) (“The plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(a) . . . cannot remove.”); see also Or. Egg Producers v. Andrew, 458 F.2d 382, 383 
(9th Cir. 1972) (“A plaintiff who commences his action in a state court cannot effectuate 
removal to a federal court even if he could have originated the action in a federal court 
and even if a counterclaim is thereafter filed that states a claim cognizable in federal 
court.”). See generally 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3730, at 429 (4th ed. 2009).  
 21 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  
 22 Id. 
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have a basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction.23 A defendant 
has thirty days from the date of service to effect removal by 
filing a notice of removal in the appropriate federal court and 
serving copies on the other parties and the clerk of the state 
court.24 If diversity provides the basis for federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction, then the defendant may not remove the lawsuit if 
he is a citizen of the state where the plaintiff filed the suit.25  
Removal becomes more complicated, and its 
contradictory nature becomes more apparent in a manner that 
has bedeviled the courts and commentators, when it does not 
occur within the initial thirty-day period. Indeed, three different 
removal issues have the potential to come into play in a 
subsequently instituted removal situation: the first- (versus last-) 
served defendant rule; the voluntary-involuntary rule; and the 
one-year limit for removing suits on the basis of diversity. 
Encompassing a contradictory variety of underlying principles 
and policies, these issues—one expressly created by statute and 
the other two judicially created—have resulted in a disjointed 
and inconsistent approach to removal that has obscured the 
underlying tension intrinsic to the removal concept: a tension 
between according deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum 
and honoring the defendant’s right to remove. An examination of 
these three subsequently instituted removal issues illustrates 
the dramatic way that this underlying tension unfolds.  
This article analyzes these three issues as they arise in 
the subsequently instituted removal context and identifies an 
overarching and unifying framework. Part I presents and 
analyzes the first-served, last-served, and intermediate rules.26 
Part II presents and analyzes the voluntary-involuntary rule.27 
Part III presents and analyzes the one-year limit on diversity-
based removal.28 Finally, Part IV identifies the common factors 
that motivate these removal issues, analyzes the reach of 
deference to the plaintiff’s forum choice and of the defendant’s 
right to remove, and proposes an overarching framework for 
analyzing these three removal issues.29  
  
 23 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).  
 24 Id. § 1446(b), (d).  
 25 Id. § 1441(b). But see id. § 1453 (eliminating this restriction for certain 
class actions pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005). 
 26 See infra notes 30-98 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 99-137 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 138-54 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 155-69 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE FIRST-SERVED, LAST-SERVED, AND INTERMEDIATE 
RULES  
Title 28 of the United States Code, at section 1446, 
requires a defendant to file a notice of removal within thirty 
days of service,30 and case law interpreting section 1441 
requires that all defendants joined and served in the action 
must consent to removal.31 When a complaint names multiple 
defendants, the potential exists that—whether due to the 
plaintiff’s intentional staggering of service or unanticipated 
service difficulties—all defendants will not be served on the 
same day. The removal statutes are silent as to how to 
reconcile the thirty-day time limit with differences in the 
timing of service of multiple defendants. Accordingly, the 
federal courts created the first-served, last-served, and 
intermediate rules as interpretations of how courts should 
implement the statutory removal timing restrictions.32 The 
significance of these rules stems from their connection to still 
another judicially created rule—the rule of unanimity.33 The 
rule of unanimity34 requires all defendants joined and served to 
consent to removal subject to some limited exceptions.35 
Because all defendants must join in the removal petition and 
the removal statute imposes a thirty-day removal window, 
courts have struggled to determine how to reconcile these 
provisions in multiple-defendant situations when the 
defendants were served on different dates.  
  
 30 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).  
 31 See, e.g., Mathews v. Cnty. of Fremont, 826 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (D. Wyo. 
1993). See 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 3730, at 440, 462. 
 32 See Lindsay E. Hale, Triggering Removal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446: The 
Eleventh Circuit’s Adoption of the Last-Served Defendant Rule in Bailey v. Janssen 
Pharmaceutica, Inc., 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 363, 364 (2008) (noting that as a result of 
the lack of clarification within 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) regarding how to calculate the 
thirty-day removal period when there are multiple defendants who were served at 
different times, the federal courts have created their own interpretations, including the 
first-served and last-served defendant rules); see also infra notes 36-38. 
 33 See Haiber, supra note 17, at 648-49 (noting that the rule of unanimity “is 
not found in the text for the removal statutes,” but has “long [been] required” by the 
federal courts). 
 34 See, e.g., Beardsley v. Torrey, 2 F. Cas. 1188, 1189 (C.C.D. Pa. 1822) (No. 
1190) (“[I]t is not competent to one defendant to remove the cause without the consent 
of his co-defendants.”). 
 35 See Mathews, 826 F. Supp. at 1318-19 (listing exceptions to the rule of 
unanimity, including nominal parties and “where federal jurisdiction of a party is 
based on a separate and independent jurisdictional grant”). In addition, certain class 
actions need not satisfy the rule of unanimity pursuant to the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1453.  
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The circuit courts are divided as to the practical 
ramifications of such staggered service. The Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals has adopted the first-served defendant rule, 
whereby the time for removal expires thirty days after the first 
defendant is served without regard to when other defendants 
are served.36 Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the alternative and 
contradictory last-served defendant rule, whereby the time for 
removal is calculated from the date of service upon the 
defendant who attempts removal, regardless of when the first 
defendant was served.37 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has adopted a third view, the so-called intermediate rule, 
which requires the filing of the notice of removal within the 
first-served defendant’s thirty-day window but permits later-
joined defendants to join that original removal notice within 
thirty days of the date of their own, subsequent service.38 The 
circuit courts, in choosing among these three alternatives, have 
grounded their approaches upon those principles and policies to 
which the circuit gives priority. 
A. The Articulated Principles and Policies Motivating the 
First-Served Defendant Rule  
The first-served defendant rule attempts to reconcile three 
general, undisputed removal principles: (1) the statutory 
provision for a thirty-day window within which a defendant must 
effect removal; (2) the axiom that courts should interpret the 
removal statutes strictly; and (3) the rule of unanimity. Under the 
first-served defendant rule, the time for removal expires thirty 
days after the first defendant is served. This interpretation is in 
accord with both the thirty-day window and a strict statutory 
construction. The first-served defendant rule also comports with 
the rule of unanimity, because if the first-served defendant 
prefers to remain in state court and thus does not remove the 
action, then this indicates a lack of unanimity among all the 
defendants, whenever served, over whether to remove the 
  
 36 See Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1986). See 
generally 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 3731, at 586. 
 37 See Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 955-56 (9th Cir. 2011); Bailey v. 
Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2008); Marano Enters. of Kan. 
v. Z-Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2001); Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible 
Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 1999). See generally 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 20, § 3731, at 597-99.  
 38 Barbour v. Int’l Union, 640 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2011). 
10 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1 
lawsuit. The Fifth Circuit, in adopting the first-served defendant 
rule, expressly relied on these three principles.39  
In Brown v. Demco, Inc.,40 the plaintiff sued various 
defendants in Louisiana state court after suffering an 
employment-related injury. The plaintiff was a Louisiana 
domiciliary, no defendant was a citizen of Louisiana, and the 
plaintiff sought more than $2 million in damages, so federal 
diversity jurisdiction was clearly available. Although the 
plaintiff served all the defendants promptly, no defendant 
removed the action to federal court. Four years later, the 
plaintiff amended his complaint to add another defendant. 
Within thirty days of service, the newly added defendant filed a 
notice of removal in which the other original defendants all 
concurred. The Fifth Circuit concluded that removal was 
improper because it fell outside the thirty days allotted to the 
first-served defendant to remove. 
[The first-served defendant rule] follows logically from the 
unanimity requirement, the thirty-day time limit, and the fact that a 
defendant may waive removal by proceeding in state court. 
Moreover, by restricting removal to instances in which the statute 
clearly permits it, the rule is consistent with the trend to limit 
removal jurisdiction and with the axiom that the removal statutes 
are to be strictly construed against removal.41  
With respect to the effect of the first-served rule upon the 
ability of later-served defendants to remove, the court stated 
that it did not perceive any unfairness to later-served 
defendants42 and observed that an alternative approach would 
introduce delay and uncertainty.43  
Although Brown involved distinctive facts due to the 
four-year interim before the addition of the final defendant, the 
Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion in a subsequent case 
involving a much smaller disparity in the timing of service. In 
Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America,44 the plaintiff 
served one defendant on September 3, another defendant on 
September 5, and the third defendant on September 24.45 The 
  
 39 Brown, 792 F.2d at 478, 481-82.  
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 482 (citation omitted). 
 42 However, of course, under the first-served defendant rule, a belatedly 
served defendant has no opportunity to remove in such an instance despite the 
statutory removal authority.  
 43 Brown, 792 F.2d at 482. 
 44 841 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 45 Id. at 1256. 
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first defendant filed a notice of removal on September 26, 
within the thirty-day window and after the plaintiff had served 
all defendants.46 However, the last-served defendant did not 
consent to removal until October 24—within thirty days of its 
own service, but not within thirty days of service upon the first-
served defendant.47 The Fifth Circuit found removal improper:  
It follows that since all served defendants must join in the petition, 
and since the petition must be submitted within thirty days of 
service on the first defendant, all served defendants must join in the 
petition no later than thirty days from the day on which the first 
defendant was served. This rule . . . promotes unanimity among the 
defendants without placing undue hardships on subsequently served 
defendants. Indeed, if a removal petition is filed by a served 
defendant and another defendant is served after the case is thus 
removed, the latter defendant may still either accept the removal or 
exercise its right to choose the state forum by making a motion to 
remand.48  
The last-served defendant rule offers an alternative 
approach, although motivated by exactly the same principles 
and policies.  
B. The Articulated Principles and Policies Motivating the 
Last-Served Defendant Rule 
The last-served defendant rule attempts to reconcile the 
same three removal principles as the first-served rule, albeit 
with a different emphasis and conclusion: (1) the statute 
provides a thirty-day window within which a defendant must 
effect removal; (2) the axiom that courts should interpret the 
removal statutes strictly; and (3) the rule of unanimity. More 
recent cases have also asserted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 
Inc.,49 supports the last-served defendant rule.  
In Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc.,50 the 
plaintiff sued two defendants in state court. The first-served 
defendant removed the suit to federal court, but the federal 
court remanded the case when the defendant could not prove 
the citizenship of the codefendant and thus could not 
  
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 1263 (footnotes omitted). 
 49 526 U.S. 344 (1999). 
 50 184 F.3d 527, 528 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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demonstrate the existence of complete diversity.51 After 
remand, the plaintiff served the second defendant, who filed a 
notice of removal within thirty days of that service; the first 
defendant filed a notice of consent to the removal on the same 
day.52 The Sixth Circuit found removal proper.  
In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit stated that 
each defendant must be accorded thirty days in which to remove, 
because an alternative construction (i.e., the first-served rule) 
“would require us to insert ‘first’ before ‘defendant’ into the 
language of the statute.”53 The court viewed the rule of unanimity 
as permitting the earlier-served defendant to consent to the last-
served defendant’s removal, even though the first defendant had 
failed in its removal attempt, because “holding otherwise would 
vitiate the removal application of the later-served defendants and 
thereby nullify our holding that later-served defendants are 
entitled to 30 days to remove the case to district court.”54  
In Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc.,55 an Eleventh 
Circuit decision, the plaintiff sued three defendants in state 
court and served the defendants on three different dates: May 
12, May 15, and June 22. All three defendants were 
represented by the same lawyer, who filed a notice of removal 
on July 24.56 The Eleventh Circuit noted the circuit split with 
respect to the first- and last-served defendant rules,57 but 
concluded that “both common sense and considerations of 
equity favor the last-served defendant rule. The first-served 
rule has been criticized by other courts as being inequitable to 
later-served defendants who, through no fault of their own, 
might, by virtue of the first-served rule, lose their statutory 
right to seek removal.”58  
  
 51 Id. at 530. 
 52 Id. at 530-31. 
 53 Id. at 533 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a similar 
construction. See Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The removal 
statute speaks of ‘the defendant’—not ‘first defendant’ or ‘initial defendant’—and its 
most straightforward meaning is that each defendant has thirty days to remove after 
being brought into the case.”). 
 54 Brierly, 184 F.3d at 534. 
 55 536 F.3d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 56 Id. The notice of removal was within the last-served defendant’s thirty-day 
window because thirty days from receipt of service was July 22, 2006, a Saturday. 
Thus, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a), the last day for filing was Monday, July 24, 
2006. Id. at 1204 n.1. 
 57 Id. at 1205. 
 58 Id. at 1206. The Ninth Circuit has also endorsed this rationale. See 
Destfino, 630 F.3d at 955 (stating that the last-served defendant rule is “grounded in 
statutory construction, equity and common sense” and that the approach “treats all 
defendants equally, regardless of when they happen to be served”). 
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The Eleventh Circuit further noted that the last-served 
rule was consistent with both the rule of unanimity and a strict 
construction of the removal statutes:  
[T]he last-served rule is not inconsistent with the rule of unanimity. 
Earlier-served defendants may choose to join in a later-served 
defendant’s motion or not, therefore preserving the rule that a notice 
of removal must have the unanimous consent of the defendants. The 
unanimity rule alone does not command that a first-served 
defendant’s failure to seek removal necessarily waives an unserved 
defendant’s right to seek removal; it only requires that the later-
served defendant receive the consent of all then-served defendants at 
the time he files his notice of removal. . . . [W]e do not find that a 
strict construction of the removal statute necessarily compels us to 
endorse the first-served defendant rule . . . .59  
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that the 
Supreme Court’s Murphy Brothers decision60 supported the last-
served defendant rule and stated that absent the Murphy 
Brothers decision, “the issue of which rule to endorse would be 
a closer call.”61 In light of Murphy Brothers’ significance to the 
Eleventh Circuit, and its mention by both the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits,62 some brief exploration of that case is 
warranted at this juncture.  
The issue in Murphy Brothers involved which of two 
events triggered the thirty-day removal window: the date that 
the defendant was formally served with process, or a previous 
date when the defendant had been faxed a courtesy copy of the 
complaint. The answer might have seemed obvious until one 
reviewed the relevant statutory language, which states that 
“[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be 
filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, 
through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading 
  
 59 Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1207. The Ninth Circuit has endorsed this rationale as 
well. See Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956 (observing that “the fact that a defendant hasn’t 
taken the initiative to seek removal doesn’t necessarily mean he will object when 
another defendant does”).  
 60 Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999). 
 61 Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1208. 
 62 See Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956 (citing Murphy Bros. as exemplifying the 
Supreme Court’s relaxation of the traditional axiom that the removal statutes are to be 
strictly construed); see also Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 
756 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that Murphy Brothers indicated that “if faced with the 
issue before us today, the [Supreme] Court would allow each defendant thirty days 
after receiving notice within which to file a notice of removal, regardless of when—or 
if—previously served defendants had filed such notices”). 
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setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or 
proceeding is based . . . .”63 
On the basis of the reference to “or otherwise,” the 
Eleventh Circuit had held that the defendant’s receipt of the 
faxed courtesy copy of the complaint started the thirty-day 
removal window.64 The Supreme Court reversed and stated that 
the removal provisions are subject to the “bedrock principle” 
that “[a]n individual or entity named as a defendant is not 
obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and 
brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.”65 The 
Court went on to explain that the statutory language reflected 
Congress’s attempt to create a uniform rule that would 
accommodate the vagaries of state provisions—in particular, 
under the practices of some states, service of process was 
considered to commence the action and service could precede 
the filing of the complaint, which created the potential that the 
removal window could close before the defendant had seen the 
complaint.66 However, the majority observed, “Nothing in the 
legislative history . . . so much as hints that Congress, in 
making changes to accommodate atypical state commencement 
and complaint filing procedures, intended to dispense with the 
historic function of service of process as the official trigger for 
responsive action by an individual or entity named 
defendant.”67 Further, the majority noted, fax machines did not 
exist at the time that Congress drafted this provision, so it 
could not have anticipated this specific scenario.68  
Murphy Brothers involved a single defendant rather 
than multiple defendants, and thus did not discuss the first- or 
  
 63 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 64 See Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 349. 
 65 Id. at 347. 
 66 Id. at 351. The Senate Report explained the problem and the statutory 
accommodation as follows: 
In some States suits are begun by the service of a summons or other process 
without the necessity of filing any pleading until later. . . . [T]his places the 
defendant in the position of having to take steps to remove a suit to Federal 
court before he knows what the suit is about. As said section is herein 
proposed to be rewritten, a defendant is not required to file his petition for 
removal until 20 [now 30] days after he has received (or it has been made 
available to him) a copy of the initial pleading filed by the plaintiff setting 
forth the claim upon which the suit is based and the relief prayed for. It is 
believed that this will meet the varying conditions of practice in all the 
States. 
S. REP. NO. 81-303, at 6 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1248, 1254. 
 67 Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 352-53.  
 68 Id. at 353 n.5.  
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last-served defendant rules. Moreover, by emphasizing service 
of process as critical to triggering the thirty-day removal 
window, the Court expressed no opinion in support or 
opposition to the competing first- and last-served defendant 
rules, both of which rely upon timing rules dating from service 
of process and nothing else. Nevertheless, the Eighth, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have relied on the case 
in endorsing the last-served defendant rule.69 All three circuits 
have characterized Murphy Brothers as representing a shift 
away from the traditional strict construction of the removal 
statutes and relied on language in Murphy Brothers in stating 
that defendants “are not required to take action . . . until they 
are properly served, ‘regardless of when—or if—previously 
served defendants had filed such notices.’”70 Therefore, 
according to these three circuits, the first-served defendant 
rule adopts a construction that would obligate a defendant to 
seek removal before receiving formal process.71  
This leads us to the third view addressing removal in 
the context of the staggered service of multiple defendants, 
referred to by its proponent circuit as “the intermediate rule.”  
C. The Articulated Principles and Policies Motivating the 
Intermediate Rule  
In what is now a familiar theme, the intermediate rule 
once again attempts to reconcile (1) the statutory thirty-day 
window within which a defendant must effect removal; (2) the 
axiom that courts should strictly interpret the removal 
statutes; and (3) the rule of unanimity. The intermediate rule, 
as described by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, “requires a notice of removal to be filed within the 
first-served defendant’s thirty-day window, but gives later-
served defendants thirty days from the date they were served 
to join the notice of removal.”72  
  
 69 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.  
 70 See Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 1208 (11th Cir. 
2008) (quoting Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 756 and 
citing Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. 344); see also Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 956 (9th 
Cir. 2011). Murphy Bros. takes no side in the first- versus last-served defendant 
debate. It simply rules out as a triggering date something other than service of process. 
 71 See Amy G. Doehring, Eleventh Circuit Adopts Last-Served Defendant Rule 
for Removal, A.B.A. LITIG. NEWS, Oct. 9, 2008, at 2. However, such a defendant 
might—for a variety of reasons, including the plaintiff’s default—never be served and 
thus play no role in removal.  
 72 Barbour v. Int’l Union, 640 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2011).  
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The Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in Barbour v. 
International Union73 is the official source of the intermediate 
rule and builds upon language in a previous decision from the 
same circuit.74 Despite labeling this position as an intermediate 
rule, which suggests that it adopts a compromise position 
between the first-served and last-served defendant rules, the 
intermediate rule does not operate as a compromise measure—
it is, in effect, consistent with the first-served defendant rule.  
In Barbour, Chrysler Corporation retirees sued the 
International Union and two local unions—Local 1183 and 
Local 1212—in state court for alleged negligence and negligent 
misrepresentation in advising the plaintiffs to retire, which 
caused the plaintiffs to lose eligibility for a retirement 
incentive package known to the defendants but not publicly 
announced until two weeks after the plaintiffs retired.75 The 
three defendants filed a joint notice of removal on April 28, 
more than thirty days after service upon the first defendant, 
within thirty days of service upon the second defendant, and 
before service upon the third defendant.76 The en banc Fourth 
Circuit concluded that “because [the first-served defendant] did 
not seek removal within its thirty-day window, the plain 
language of [section] 1446(b) dictates that it forfeited its right 
to removal.”77 Thus, under the so-called intermediate rule, the 
time for removal expires thirty days after the first defendant is 
served, without regard to when other defendants are served—
the same result required by the first-served defendant rule.  
Although Barbour makes much of according later-
served defendants a full thirty days under the intermediate 
rule in which to decide whether to join or challenge the existing 
removal notice,78 the distinction between the intermediate rule 
and the first-served defendant rule in this regard is more 
subtle than Barbour suggests. Under the rule of unanimity, the 
  
 73 Id.  
 74 See McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th 
Cir. 1992).  
 75 Barbour, 640 F.3d at 602-03. 
 76 Id. at 604. 
 77 Id. at 611. 
 78 Id. at 607 (“Like the First-Served Defendant Rule, the McKinney 
Intermediate Rule requires a notice of removal to be filed within the first-served 
defendant’s thirty-day window, but gives later-served defendants thirty days from the 
date they were served to join the notice of removal.”); see also id. at 611 (“If the first-
served defendant files a notice of removal, later-served defendants have ample time—
thirty days from the date that each such defendant is served—to decide whether to join 
the notice of removal . . . .”). 
2011] THE ROOTS OF REMOVAL 17 
defendants who have been joined and served must all consent 
to removal. Later-served defendants, however, are not bound 
by the removal notice—they may move to remand and thereby 
defeat removal. Accordingly, the distinction between the 
intermediate rule and the first-served defendant rule is seen 
when subsequently served defendants are served after the first 
defendant, but before the expiration of the first-served 
defendant’s thirty-day window. For example, if Defendant #1 is 
served on Day 1 and Defendant #2 is served on Day 10, under 
the first-served defendant rule Defendant #2 has twenty days 
to decide whether to join the notice of removal, whereas under 
the intermediate rule he would have thirty days. This 
difference is hardly a compromise between the first-served and 
last-served defendant rules. The intermediate rule offers a 
relatively minor difference of statutory interpretation by giving 
every subsequently served defendant a full thirty days to 
evaluate whether to join an existing removal notice, but adds 
nothing to the statute’s motivating principles and policies.79  
In sum, due to section 1446(b)’s silence on the issue, and 
despite ostensibly relying on the same principles and policies, 
the circuits are divided in their application of the statute in the 
multiple-defendant context. Indeed, even some of the 
challenges in reading the statute are the same: one of the 
justifications sometimes proffered in favor of the last-served 
rule—that the alternative first-served approach would require 
reading “first served” into the statute’s text80—is itself subject 
to the same challenge (i.e., the last-served defendant approach 
similarly requires reading “last served” into the statute).  
Choosing among these approaches has been made more 
difficult because the courts’ decisions have failed to recognize 
the practical and conceptual dilemma that underlies all the 
analyses: the tension between plaintiff control and defendant-
initiated removal.  
  
 79 See id. at 605 (“Removal statutes . . . must be strictly construed, inasmuch 
as the removal of cases from state to federal court raises significant federalism 
concerns.”); id. at 613 (stating that the intermediate rule is consistent with 
“constru[ing] removal statutes narrowly and that doubts concerning removal should be 
resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction”); id. at 611 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) 
provides a thirty-day removal window and “[i]f you do not seek removal within the 
thirty-day window, you have forfeited your right to remove”); id. (rule of unanimity); id. 
at 614 (“All three of the rules before the court are consistent with the rule of 
unanimity, because each of them requires all of the defendants at some point in time to 
unanimously agree to removal.”). 
 80 See, e.g., Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533 
(6th Cir. 1999). 
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D. The Unseen Tension Behind the Rules: The Power to 
Select the Forum  
Although the majority of federal courts addressing the 
issue follows the first-served defendant rule,81 some courts and 
commentators have referred to the alternative last-served rule 
as the current “trend.”82 All but a few court decisions fail to 
acknowledge the unexpressed rationale or concern underlying 
the choice between the first-served, last-served, and 
intermediate rules: limiting the defendant’s opportunity to 
remove (the first-served and intermediate rules) versus 
maximizing the defendant’s opportunity to remove (the last-
served rule). In selecting which rule to follow, courts must strike 
a balance between a plaintiff’s right to select the forum versus a 
defendant’s right to remove to federal court, and this ultimate 
choice drives judicial policy. Often—and certainly more often 
than is acknowledged—the outcome may depend on the court’s 
normative approach as more pro-plaintiff or more pro-defendant.  
1. Plaintiff’s Control of the Forum  
In Brown v. Demco, Inc.,83 discussed above,84 the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit elected to follow the first-
served defendant rule and characterized it as “[t]he general 
rule.”85 Although Brown was cast in an unusual posture—the 
matter had been proceeding in state court for four years and 
removal was sought only after the plaintiff added a new 
defendant—concerns that removal would unfairly benefit the 
defendants and cause an unfair detriment to the plaintiff 
  
 81 See C. Todd Hagins, Sands in an Hourglass: Solving the Puzzle of Time 
Limits for Removal to Federal Court, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 421, 423 (2001) (“[A] majority 
of federal district courts follow the first-served defendant rule . . . .”). 
 82 See Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The trend in 
recent case law favors the later-served defendant rule.”); Bailey v. Janssen 
Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 1205 (11th Cir. 2008) (observing that “the trend in 
recent case law favors the last-served defendant rule”); Gen. Pump & Well, Inc. v. Laibe 
Supply Corp., No. CV607-30, 2007 WL 3238721, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 31, 2007) (“More 
recently, . . . the trend in the case law has been toward the later-served rule.”); Hagins, 
supra note 81, at 426 (“There is a trend away from the first-served defendant rule.”); 
Hale, supra note 32, at 381 (noting that a “concern often cited as supportive of the last-
served rule is the need to prevent a tactical advantage by the plaintiff in manipulating 
the removal statute in order to prevent removal to federal court”); Matthew C. Lucas, 
Diversity Jurisdiction Removal in Florida, 77 FLA. B.J. 54, 57 (2003) (noting that the last-
served defendant rule “appears to be gaining acceptance in the courts”). 
 83 792 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1986).  
 84 See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. 
 85 Brown, 792 F.2d at 481. 
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clearly influenced the court. The court noted “the axiom that 
the removal statutes are to be strictly construed against 
removal,” and stated, in a particularly revealing passage, 
Here all of the appellees but [one] not only let the thirty-day period 
elapse, but also defended this action in state court for four 
years. . . . To permit the defendants in this case to obtain removal 
after they have tested state-court waters for four years would give 
them a second opportunity to forum-shop and further delay the 
progress of the suit. The unfairness of this to the plaintiff outweighs 
the unfairness, if any, to the last-joined defendant. The forum for a 
suit ought to be settled at some time early in the litigation.86  
The Brown Court’s analysis is worth a deeper review. 
First, the court relied on the strict construction rule, referring 
to construing the statutes “strictly . . . against removal,” thus 
indicating its preference for protecting the plaintiff’s choice of 
forum.87 Second, the court followed the strict construction rule 
with the characterization that the last-joined defendant’s 
attempt to remove presented an opportunity to “forum-shop 
and further delay the progress of the suit.”88 Third, after 
characterizing the defendants in an unfavorable manner (i.e., 
as seeking to delay the proceedings and employ a procedural 
route to a more favorable outcome), the court said such forum 
shopping and delay were unfair to the plaintiff, who should 
have assurances as to the forum “early in the litigation.”89 In 
Brown, the plaintiffs did not benefit from section 1446(b)’s one-
year limitation on diversity-based removal; Congress did not 
enact the one-year provision until two years after the Brown 
decision.90 However, the absence of any outer time limit for 
removal at the time of the Brown decision arguably should 
have resulted in greater protection of the defendant’s right to 
remove, not less. The deference accorded to the plaintiff’s 
choice of forum is thus a powerful policy that has the ability 
not only to skew certain outcomes in a plaintiff’s favor, but to 
actually overcome the defendant’s statutory right to removal. 
  
 86 Id. at 482. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Brown v. Demco, Inc. was decided in 1986. See id. Congress added the one-
year limitation to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) in 1988. See Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
962 F.2d 513, 515 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the one-year limitation was enacted 
on November 19, 1988). 
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2. Defendant’s Right to Removal and Potential Plaintiff 
Manipulation  
The potential for manipulation by plaintiffs appears to 
play a role in many of the decisions that have chosen the last-
served rule.91 As explained below, the first-served and 
intermediate rules encompass the possibility that a plaintiff 
suing multiple defendants might strategically use service of 
process to defeat removal. In contrast, the last-served rule 
eliminates this potential for manipulation by leaving open the 
removal option for later-served defendants.  
One of the cases expressing concern about plaintiff 
manipulation most directly was White v. White,92 a federal district 
court decision in which circuit law bound the district court to 
follow the first-served defendant rule.93 However, due to concerns 
about plaintiff manipulation, the district court concluded that 
“exceptional circumstances” permitted removal.94 The district 
court stated that the plaintiff set a “removal trap” through “first 
serving an unsophisticated defendant who is least likely to 
attempt removal. Then the trap is sprung by not serving the 
more sophisticated defendants who are likely to attempt removal 
until 30 days has elapsed. Snap, removal is barred . . . .”95 
Although White is one of the few cases to find the “exceptional 
circumstances” exception to the first-served defendant rule 
satisfied, its rationale fits justifications for the last-served 
defendant rule. As one commentator observed, White’s broad use 
of “forum manipulation” as an exceptional circumstance “hints 
that any plaintiff failing to serve every known defendant 
promptly at the same time runs the risk of failing in a motion to 
remand a removed case back to state court.”96  
The plaintiff manipulation concern has two alternative 
potential sources. On the one hand, when a court frames the 
issue as plaintiff manipulation, the court may view deference to 
  
 91 See, e.g., McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 928 
(4th Cir. 1992); White v. White, 32 F. Supp. 2d 890, 893 (W.D. La. 1998), abrogated in 
part by Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999); see also 
Hale, supra note 32, at 381 (“[A] concern often cited as supportive of the last-served 
rule is the need to prevent a tactical advantage by the plaintiff in manipulating the 
removal statute in order to prevent removal to federal court.”). 
 92 32 F. Supp. 2d at 893. 
 93 Id. at 892-93. 
 94 Id. at 893. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Hagins, supra note 81, at 426 (expressing disbelief that “such a broad 
exception” would be considered “an exceptional one”). 
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the plaintiff’s choice of forum as desirable, but may view this 
particular plaintiff as undeserving because she engaged in 
manipulative behavior.97 On the other hand, courts may use 
broad-brush characterizations of plaintiff manipulation that 
reflect a more generalized distrust of plaintiffs with 
corresponding greater sympathy for defendants. In the specific 
context of adopting the last-served defendant rule, several 
federal courts have employed rationales reflecting a concern 
that the first-served rule was simply too pro-plaintiff.98  
II. THE VOLUNTARY-INVOLUNTARY RULE  
Section 1446(b)—the underlying source of the first- and 
last-served defendant rules—is also the source of the voluntary-
involuntary rule. Section 1446(b) provides, as relevant to this 
discussion,  
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of 
removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the 
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended 
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be 
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become 
removable . . . .99  
Although this statutory language suggests that the 
defendant has an entitlement to remove upon the specified 
receipt of a paper reflecting that a case initially nonremovable 
has become removable, there is a judicially created 
precondition: the case must have become removable due to the 
  
 97 More generally in the field of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, courts 
have relied on statutory authority to defeat manipulative efforts to invoke federal court 
jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2006), but often have tolerated manipulative efforts 
to defeat federal court jurisdiction. See Gentle v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 161, 
163 (D. Me. 1969) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1359 prohibits improper or collusive joinder 
to create federal jurisdiction but no similar statute bars collusive action to defeat 
federal jurisdiction); see also id. at 165-66 (noting that “many, though not all, federal 
courts have sustained the use of assignments to defeat diversity”). There is no pretense 
of balanced treatment in this area.  
 98 See, e.g., Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating 
that the first-served defendant rule could “encourage plaintiffs to engage in unfair 
manipulation by delaying service on defendants most likely to remove”); Collings v. E-Z 
Serve Convenience Stores, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 892, 894 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (stating that 
each defendant must be allowed thirty days in which to remove because to hold 
otherwise “[o]pens the way for the plaintiff to deliberately avoid removal by delayed 
service upon a defendant anticipated to seek removal”); see also McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. 
of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that under the first-
served defendant rule, “the rights of defendants generally could be rather easily 
overcome by tactical maneuvering by plaintiffs”).  
 99 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).  
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plaintiff’s voluntary action.100 Unlike the first- versus last-
served defendant rules, there is no circuit split here—every 
circuit addressing the issue has followed the voluntary-
involuntary rule,101 although there are some differences among 
the circuits in the specifics of applying the rule.102 Accordingly, 
in a lawsuit filed in state court and based on state law, if the 
plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a nondiverse defendant, the 
remaining defendant(s) may remove the suit based on 
diversity. But if the court dismisses that same nondiverse 
defendant without the plaintiff’s consent, then the remaining 
defendant(s) may not remove because the plaintiff’s voluntary 
action did not accomplish the dismissal. The death of a 
nondiverse defendant is the sole exception to the voluntary-
involuntary rule and permits removal.103  
The voluntary-involuntary rule—characterized by one 
commentator as having “a questionable pedigree” and “suspect” 
justifications104—is a particularly interesting contradiction in 
removal jurisprudence. The rule’s origins ostensibly come from 
two U.S. Supreme Court decisions a century ago. In Powers v. 
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.,105 the Supreme Court held 
that the case became removable after the plaintiff voluntarily 
dismissed the nondiverse defendants.106 Subsequently, in 
  
 100 See generally John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute’s 
Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 998-99 (1998) 
(“Under the voluntary-involuntary rule, when a court dismisses a removal-defeating 
claim with the plaintiff’s consent, the case becomes removable. However, when such a 
dismissal is without the plaintiff’s consent, the case does not become removable despite 
the change in its structure.”).  
 101 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 510 & n.10 (2004) (citing 
eight circuit courts affirming the voluntary-involuntary rule). 
 102 See Heather R. Barber, Removal and Remand, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1555, 
1583 (2004) (explaining that the Second Circuit defines “voluntary” more broadly than 
the other circuits to include situations “where the removability of the case is the result 
of a decision of the court,” and where the plaintiff elects not to appeal the court’s 
decision); Jeff Fisher, Everybody Plays the Fool, Sometimes; There’s No Exception to the 
Rule: Procedural Misjoinder Is Not an Exception to the Voluntary-Involuntary Rule, 60 
BAYLOR L. REV. 993, 999-1000 (2008) (noting that the circuit courts “sometimes 
disagree about what constitutes a voluntary act”). 
 103 See Bradley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 100 F. Supp. 913, 917-
18 (E.D. Okla. 1951). 
 104 James M. Underwood, From Proxy to Principle: Fraudulent Joinder 
Reconsidered, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1013, 1026 (2006). Others have similarly criticized the rule. See 
Jenkins v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pa., 650 F. Supp. 609, 614 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (describing 
the voluntary-involuntary rule as “antiquated” or “arbitrary”); James F. Archibald III, Note, 
Reintroducing “Fraud” to the Doctrine of Fraudulent Joinder, 78 VA. L. REV. 1377, 1384 (1992) 
(describing the “apparent baselessness” of the voluntary-involuntary rule). 
 105 169 U.S. 92 (1898).  
 106 Id. at 102.  
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Whitcomb v. Smithson,107 the Supreme Court determined that 
the case did not become removable when the trial court 
dismissed the nondiverse defendant without the plaintiff’s 
assent.108 As summarized by the Eleventh Circuit,  
[T]he long-standing, judicially created “voluntary-involuntary” 
rule . . . is a rule developed in diversity cases “that if the resident 
defendant was dismissed from the case by the voluntary act of the 
plaintiff, the case became removable, but if the dismissal was the 
result of either the defendant’s or the court’s action against the wish 
of the plaintiff, the case could not be removed.”109  
Although the court in the excerpt above seems to 
suggest that the voluntary-involuntary rule is limited to 
diversity cases, courts have applied the rule to both diversity 
and arising-under cases.110  
Congress amended the removal statutes in 1948 and 
again in 1949.111 Some courts and commentators have argued 
that the voluntary-involuntary rule did not survive the 
amendments because amended section 1446(b) states that “an 
amended pleading, motion, order or other paper” could render a 
case removable;112 the reference to an “order” as rendering a 
case removable, without more, seemed to suggest that 
voluntariness (or involuntariness) played no role.113 
  
 107 175 U.S. 635 (1900).  
 108 Id. at 638.  
 109 Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249, 252 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Weems v. 
Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir. 1967)).  
 110 See People v. Keating, 986 F.2d 346, 348 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Here, this case 
was transformed into an action ‘arising under’ federal law not by the voluntary action 
of the plaintiff, but instead by action of a defendant. Since a voluntary act by the 
plaintiff has not rendered the case removable, it must remain in state court.”). 
 111 See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 351-
52 (1999).  
 112 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006); see also Lyon v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 228 F. Supp. 810, 
811 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (“There is nothing in [amended section 1446(b)] from which it can 
be properly inferred that Congress intended that a removal could be effected only in the 
event the plaintiff voluntarily did something which removed the local defendant from the 
case.”); Weems, 380 F.2d at 546-47 (noting that “[t]he effect of [the 1949] amendment has 
been variously interpreted,” and that “[i]t is contended . . . that the [voluntary-
involuntary] rule did not survive an amendment to the Judicial Code in 1949”). 
 113 See Weems, 380 F.2d at 547-49; see also Joan Steinman, Postremoval 
Changes in the Party Structure of Diversity Cases: The Old Law, the New Law, and 
Rule 19, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 863, 872 n.25 (1990) (“[C]ommentators had observed that it 
was not entirely clear whether the voluntary-involuntary distinction had survived the 
1949 amendments to § 1446.”); Underwood, supra note 104, at 1100, 1106 (stating that 
“there is nothing in the language of the statute to suggest any intent to require federal 
courts to continue utilizing the voluntary/involuntary rule—the bare language of the 
statute at least hinting at the inverse,” and urging that the rule be abandoned). 
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The Supreme Court has explained the basic history 
leading up to the 1948 and 1949 amendments to section 
1446(b); the concerns that motivated the amendments did not 
involve the voluntary-involuntary rule, but rather centered on 
the concern that the defendant have access to the complaint 
before the removal period commenced.114  
Despite the potential argument that the statutory 
amendments eliminated the voluntary-involuntary rule, the 
federal circuit courts ultimately rejected this contention.115 One 
court explained,  
We will not buck the trend, nor will we rehash the legislative history. 
Suffice it to say that when Congress referred to “a case which is or has 
become removable” in section 1446(b), Congress apparently intended 
to incorporate the existing definition of “removable,” a definition that 
included the voluntary/involuntary rule.116  
This offers a plausible, but not a mandated, interpretation of 
the 1948 and 1949 amendments. The congressional report, 
which courts have cited for the proposition that Congress 
  
 114 Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 351-52. 
Prior to 1948, a defendant could remove a case any time before the expiration 
of her time to respond to the complaint under state law. Because the time 
limits for responding to the complaint varied from State to State, however, 
the period for removal correspondingly varied. To reduce the disparity, 
Congress in 1948 enacted the original version of § 1446(b), which provided 
that “[t]he petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding may be filed 
within twenty days after commencement of the action or service of process, 
whichever is later.” . . . Congress soon recognized, however, that § 1446(b), as 
first framed, did not “give adequate time and operate uniformly” in all States. 
In States such as New York, most notably, service of the summons 
commenced the action, and such service could precede the filing of the 
complaint. Under § 1446(b) as originally enacted, the period for removal in 
such a State could have expired before the defendant obtained access to the 
complaint. To ensure that the defendant would have access to the complaint 
before commencement of the removal period, Congress in 1949 enacted the 
current version of § 1446(b): “The petition for removal of a civil action or 
proceeding shall be filed within twenty days [now thirty days] after the 
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial 
pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or 
proceeding is based.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 115 See Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 71-72 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting 
that although defendants argued that section 1446(b) had eliminated the rule, “[e]very 
court of appeals that has addressed the voluntary/involuntary rule has held that it 
survived the enactment of section 1446(b)” (citation omitted)).  
 116 Id. at 72.  
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intended to retain the rule, is more ambiguous than the courts 
have suggested.117  
A closer look at the cited report illustrates that the 
courts have lifted one particular quotation out of context. In 
fact, although we have set out the relevant portion of the report 
in full in the footnote below,118 the simple addition of the 
sentence preceding and the sentence following the lifted 
quotation make the context apparent:  
The second paragraph of the amendment to [section 1446,] subsection 
(b) is intended to make clear that the right of removal may be 
exercised at a later stage of the case if the initial pleading does not 
state a removable case but its removability is subsequently disclosed. 
This is declaratory of the existing rule laid down by the decisions. (See 
for example, Powers v. Chesapeake etc., Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92.)119  
  
 117 Id. (citing a quote from the Senate Report that the amendment is 
“declaratory of the existing rule laid down by the decisions”).  
 118 The relevant description of the bill in full states: 
Subsection (b) of section 1446 of title 28, U.S.C., as revised, has been found to 
create difficulty in those States, such as New York, where suit is commenced 
by the service of a summons and the plaintiff’s initial pleading is not required 
to be served or filed until later. 
The first paragraph of the amendment to subsection (b) corrects this 
situation by providing that the petition for removal need not be filed until 20 
days after the defendant has received a copy of the plaintiff’s initial pleading. 
This provision, however, without more, would create further difficulty in 
those States, such as Kentucky, where suit is commenced by the filing of the 
plaintiff’s initial pleading and the issuance and service of summons without 
any requirement that a copy of the pleading be served upon or otherwise 
furnished to the defendant. Accordingly the first paragraph of the 
amendment provides that in such cases the petition for removal shall be filed 
within 20 days after the service of the summons. 
The first paragraph of the amendment conforms to the amendment of rule 
81(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to removed actions, 
adopted by the Supreme Court on December 29, 1948, and reported by the 
Court to the present session of Congress. 
The second paragraph of the amendment to subsection (b) is intended to 
make clear that the right of removal may be exercised at a later stage of the 
case if the initial pleading does not state a removable case but its 
removability is subsequently disclosed. This is declaratory of the existing rule 
laid down by the decisions. (See for example, Powers v. Chesapeake etc., Ry. 
Co., 169 U.S. 92.)  
In addition, this amendment clarifies the intent of section 1446(e) of title 28, 
U.S.C., to indicate that notice need not be given simultaneously with the 
filing, but may be given promptly thereafter. 
H.R. REP. NO. 81-352, at 11 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1254, 1268. 
 119 Id. 
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The federal courts have concluded that the reference to 
“removable” in the quotation above was intended to incorporate 
all existing case law refinements. This is certainly a plausible 
construction—in these amendments, Congress was focused 
primarily on addressing one particular issue (ensuring that 
defendants would have access to a copy of the complaint before 
the removal period commenced), and secondarily on clarifying 
that removal due to changed circumstances could occur late in 
the case proceedings. However, it is at least equally plausible 
that due to these same foci, Congress would have expressly 
included the voluntary-involuntary rule if it intended to 
preserve it.120 The lack of any statutory reference to the 
voluntary-involuntary rule—especially in an era of “plain 
meaning” statutory construction—suggests that courts should 
exercise extreme caution in continuing to import the rule in the 
absence of any specific statutory language. In particular, 
Powers, cited in the congressional report, had permitted the 
defendant to remove after the plaintiff dismissed claims 
against the nondiverse defendants despite the fact that these 
dismissals occurred, and thus removal was sought “when [the 
case] was called for trial.”121  
Thus, Powers serves as an example of authorizing a 
defendant to remove on the basis of subsequent removability at 
a very late point in the proceedings, namely the eve of trial, but 
it is far less clear that Congress intended this reference to 
affirm the continued viability of the voluntary-involuntary rule. 
Lacking any clear statutory direction, the continued viability of 
the voluntary-involuntary distinction—if any justification 
remains—must rest on the articulated principles and policies 
  
 120 Cf. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 566-67 
(2005) (concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 by its plain text overruled both Clark v. Paul 
Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939) and Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 
(1973)). Despite a vigorous dissent, the Court rejected arguments that congressional 
reports indicated an intention to leave the holdings from those prior decisions intact: 
Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent 
they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of 
otherwise ambiguous terms. . . . [J]udicial reliance on legislative materials 
like committee reports, which are not themselves subject to the requirements 
of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee members—or, worse yet, 
unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the incentive to attempt 
strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were 
unable to achieve through the statutory text. 
Id. at 568. 
 121 Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 98 (1898). 
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that courts have used to justify the rule. The next section 
addresses these policy pillars.  
A. The Articulated Principles and Policies Motivating the 
Voluntary-Involuntary Rule  
The voluntary-involuntary rule appears to have two 
primary directing purposes: (1) promoting judicial economy122 
and (2) deferring to the plaintiff’s choice of forum.123 The 
judicial-economy rationale comes entirely from circuit court 
decisions; the Supreme Court has never proffered a judicial-
economy rationale for the rule.124 This judicial-economy 
rationale appears to stem from finality concerns. If a court 
dismisses a nondiverse defendant from the action through an 
involuntary dismissal and the dismissal is appealed, the 
potential exists that the appellate court could set aside the 
dismissal, which would destroy complete diversity.125  
  
 122 See, e.g., Poulos, 959 F.2d at 72.  
 123 See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 282 (1918) (“The obvious 
principle . . . is that . . . the plaintiff may by the allegations of his complaint determine 
the status with respect to removability of a case, arising under a law of the United 
States, when it is commenced, and that this power to determine the removability of his 
case continues with the plaintiff throughout the litigation, so that whether such a case 
nonremovable when commenced shall afterwards become removable depends not upon 
what the defendant may allege or prove or what the court may, after hearing upon the 
merits, in invitum, order, but solely upon the form which the plaintiff by his voluntary 
action shall give to the pleadings in the case as it progresses towards a conclusion.”). 
 124 Jenkins v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 650 F. Supp. 609, 613-14 (N.D. Ga. 
1986) (“Study of the Supreme Court cases that developed the rule discloses that the 
voluntary-involuntary rule is not based upon an appealability/finality rationale . . . .”); 
Archibald, supra note 104, at 1386 (“Predictably, courts continuing to adhere solely to 
the Supreme Court’s stated rationale for the rule have rejected these cases and, 
accordingly, have deemphasized the role of federal courts in allocating cases between 
state and federal forums.”). 
 125 Higgins v. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1988). 
[I]f the non-diverse party has been involuntary dismissed by order of the 
state judge[, t]he plaintiff may choose to appeal the dismissal. Although 
complete diversity may temporarily exist between the parties, suggesting 
that removal is proper, diversity jurisdiction may ultimately be destroyed if 
the state appellate court reverses the dismissal of the non-diverse party. 
Therefore, some cases are not removable despite complete diversity between 
the parties. 
Id.; see also Am. Car & Foundry Co. v. Kettelhake, 236 U.S. 311, 316 (1915) (“[W]here 
there is a joint cause of action against defendants resident of the same state with the 
plaintiff and a nonresident defendant, it must appear, to make the case a removable 
one as to a nonresident defendant because of dismissal as to resident defendants, that 
the discontinuance as to such defendants was voluntary on the part of the plaintiff, and 
that such action has taken the resident defendants out of the case, so as to leave a 
controversy wholly between the plaintiff and the nonresident defendant.”). 
28 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1 
In addition to the finality/appealability concern, “[t]here 
also appears to be a policy favoring a plaintiff’s right, absent 
fraudulent joinder, to determine the removability of his case.”126 
The Supreme Court decisions that address the voluntary-
involuntary rule cite only this second purpose.127 Courts have 
analogized the deference accorded to the plaintiff’s forum 
choice by the voluntary-involuntary rule to the Mottley rule128 in 
arising-under cases, whereby the presence (or absence) of 
arising-under jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in 
the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint, without regard to the 
defendant’s pleadings or the defendant’s anticipated defenses.129 
However, the analogy of the voluntary-involuntary rule to 
Mottley raises its own issues and ultimately leads right back to 
the underlying tension between according deference to the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum and the defendant’s right to remove.  
B. Mottley and the Deference Debate  
Courts have analogized the voluntary-involuntary rule, 
founded upon deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum, to the 
Mottley “well-pleaded complaint” rule in arising-under cases.130 
However, the Mottley analogy is less helpful—and less apt—
than it appears initially. First, the Mottley rule is not always 
clear in application. In applying the Mottley rule, a court 
should disregard the defendant’s pleadings and examine only 
  
 126 Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249, 253 (11th Cir. 1988). Concerns regarding 
plaintiff manipulation have been partially addressed by declining to apply the voluntary-
involuntary rule to situations involving fraudulent joinder. See id. (“absent fraudulent 
joinder”); see also Great N. Ry. Co., 246 U.S. at 282 (“The obvious principle of [the 
voluntary-involuntary rule] is that, in the absence of fraudulent purpose to defeat 
removal, the plaintiff may by the allegations of his complaint determine the status with 
respect to removability of a case . . . .”). With respect to fraudulent joinder, see generally 
Fisher, supra note 102, at 1012-15 (arguing that “[p]rocedural misjoinder and fraudulent 
joinder behave almost identically,” and that neither is technically an “exception” to the 
voluntary-involuntary rule; rather, the voluntary-involuntary rule simply “should not be 
applied to those claims”); see also Underwood, supra note 104, at 1018 (“Stated simply, 
fraudulent joinder is a doctrine that permits federal courts to essentially ignore the 
inclusion in a lawsuit of a nondiverse party who would otherwise destroy federal diversity 
jurisdiction when the district court concludes that the party’s joinder is a sham.”). 
 127 See Jenkins, 650 F. Supp. at 613-14 (“What emerges from an examination 
of the Supreme Court cases on the voluntary-involuntary rule is the conclusion that the 
rule is not based upon an appealability/finality rationale but upon a policy favoring the 
plaintiff’s ‘power to determine the removability of his case.’”).  
 128 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).  
 129 See Insinga, 845 F.2d at 253 (noting “[t]he common origins of the 
voluntary-involuntary rule with Mottley and its progeny in federal question cases”). 
 130 See supra notes 123, 126-30 and accompanying text.  
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the complaint.131 Next, the court must ascertain whether the 
complaint’s allegations support arising-under jurisdiction as 
“well pleaded” and that the complaint does not include 
anticipated federal defenses. This review can be more difficult 
than one might think,132 and a plaintiff may draft her complaint 
in a manner specifically intended to keep the action in state 
court by scrupulously avoiding the inclusion of any apparent 
basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction—yet nevertheless 
find herself in the very federal court that she had sought to 
avoid. One prominent example of such a circumstance occurred 
in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & 
Manufacturing.133 In Grable, the plaintiff constructed its 
lawsuit as a quiet title action filed in Michigan state court, only 
to find its suit removed to federal court on the basis of arising-
under jurisdiction.134 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
quiet title action, although a state-law claim, necessarily raised 
the federal issue of whether the Internal Revenue Service had 
given Grable the notice required by section 6335 of the Tax 
Code before seizing Grable’s property to satisfy a federal tax 
delinquency and then subsequently selling the property to 
Darue.135 The Court held that this federal issue was of sufficient 
importance to invoke arising-under jurisdiction.136 The fact that 
a sufficiently necessary, albeit latent, federal issue lay within 
the state claim took away the plaintiff’s preferred state forum 
and substituted a federal one.  
Of course, Grable’s federal issue, although latent, 
existed from the very outset of the litigation, whereas 
situations involving the voluntary-involuntary rule, by 
definition, arise due to some change occurring subsequent to 
the filing of the lawsuit. And if this distinction is not enough, 
  
 131 Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152.  
 132 Id. at 152-53.  
 133 545 U.S. 308 (2005).  
 134 Id. at 311. 
 135 Id. at 314-15. 
 136 Id. at 315-16. Similarly, a plaintiff may draft her complaint in a manner 
intended to permit her to litigate in federal court, and yet nevertheless find that the 
federal court she desired will not allow her to remain. An example of this circumstance 
occurred in Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006), in 
which the dissent observed, “There is little about this case that is not federal.” Id. at 
702 (Breyer, J., dissenting). A private insurance carrier, providing health insurance to 
federal employees pursuant to a contract with the federal government as authorized by 
a federal statute, sought reimbursement from one such federal employee in accordance 
with the terms of the federal contract. The Court’s majority held that the action was 
merely a contractual claim for reimbursement, and thus lacking arising-under 
jurisdiction, it could not proceed in federal court. Id. at 692-93 (majority opinion). 
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analysis of the Mottley rule arises in a contextually distinct 
environment from the voluntary-involuntary analysis. The 
Mottley rule always concerns the four corners of the complaint 
and thus always has as its vantage point the outset of the 
litigation, whereas the voluntary-involuntary rule always 
concerns some later change in the contours of the litigation. 
Moreover, although the Mottley rule applies only to arising-
under jurisdiction, the voluntary-involuntary rule applies to 
both arising-under and diversity, which creates the potential 
for a plaintiff to “double dip”—to obtain the benefit of the 
Mottley rule in determining the existence of arising-under 
jurisdiction in the first instance, plus the benefit of the 
voluntary-involuntary rule after subsequent changes. So even 
assuming that the Mottley analogy is still apt, it appears that 
the voluntary-involuntary rule as currently applied may accord 
too much deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum. Just as the 
Mottley rule cannot insulate a plaintiff from arising-under 
jurisdiction that actually exists, so too the voluntary-
involuntary rule should not generally insulate a plaintiff from 
removal when federal jurisdiction actually exists.  
Although courts have expressly applied the Mottley 
analogy only to the plaintiff’s control rationale, the Grable 
decision serves as a reminder that forum selection is a two-
way, rather than a one-way, street. If plaintiffs were accorded 
complete control over forum selection, the removal statutes 
would be rendered pointless. As noted by one commentator, 
“Removal does not deprive plaintiffs of any ‘right,’ but merely 
affords defendants an equal opportunity to litigate in federal 
court. . . . Additionally, removal does not expand federal 
jurisdiction, but merely allows cases involving federal 
jurisdiction to be heard in a federal court.”137 Accordingly, the 
voluntary-involuntary rule would appear to rest on a largely 
empty analytical basis.  
III. THE ONE-YEAR LIMITATION  
In 1988, Congress amended section 1446(b) to provide 
that “a case may not be removed on the basis of [diversity 
jurisdiction] more than 1 year after commencement of the 
action.”138 This generates questions over a third issue of belated 
removal and yet another contradiction within the doctrine—an 
  
 137 Haiber, supra note 17, at 611-12.  
 138 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006).  
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absolute cutoff that applies to some, but not all, removal 
circumstances. Perhaps the primary issue with respect to this 
provision is why defendants seeking to remove on the basis of 
arising-under jurisdiction have no outer time limit, whereas 
defendants seeking to remove on the basis of diversity face a 
one-year time limit. The legislative history to the 1988 
amendment suggests that “[t]he amendment addresses 
problems that arise from a change of parties as an action 
progresses toward trial in state court. . . . Removal late in the 
proceedings may result in substantial delay and disruption.”139  
However, imposing a one-year limitation on diversity 
removal, but not arising-under removal, indicates that the 
concern is not the potential disruption of ongoing state 
proceedings but simply reflects disfavor toward diversity 
jurisdiction.140 Despite the seemingly straightforward nature of 
this provision, two interpretive issues have plagued the courts: 
first, whether the one-year limitation reflects a jurisdictional 
bar141 or merely a procedural defect,142 and second, whether the 
one-year limitation applies to all diversity removals143 or only to 
those that were not removable originally.144 Although not as 
obvious, these issues once again expose the underlying tension 
between plaintiff’s-deference and defendant’s-right-to-remove.  
The legislative documents reveal that in enacting the 
one-year limitation on diversity-based removal, Congress 
intended to reduce “the opportunity for removal after 
substantial progress has been made in state court.”145 Rather 
than attempting to define “substantial progress,” Congress 
  
 139 H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 44 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 
6032-33; see also Riverdale Baptist Church v. Certainteed Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 943, 
950 (D. Md. 2004) (quoting same).  
 140 See Oakley, supra note 100, at 1002 (“This [one-year limitation] rule has 
been strongly and aptly criticized as a backhanded attack on diversity jurisdiction . . . .”); 
see also Underwood, supra note 104, at 1105 (“The fact that this concern does not pertain 
to federal question cases demonstrates an anti-diversity bias on the part of Congress.”).  
 141 See Howell v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 955 F. Supp. 660, 662-63 
(M.D. La. 1997); Price v. Messer, 872 F. Supp. 317, 320 (S.D.W. Va. 1995); Foiles v. 
Merrell Nat’l Labs., 730 F. Supp. 108, 110 (N.D. Ill. 1989).  
 142 See In re Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 104 F.3d 322, 324 (11th Cir. 1997); 
Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1992); Kinabrew v. 
Emco-Wheaton, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 351, 352-53 (M.D. La. 1996); see also Tedford v. 
Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 426-28 (5th Cir. 2003) (approving an equitable 
tolling exception when circumstances suggest possible manipulation by plaintiff).  
 143 See Foiles, 730 F. Supp. at 110. 
 144 See Brown v. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 284 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir. 
2002); Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 534-35 (6th Cir. 
1999); Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 145 Judicial Improvements & Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 
§ 1016(b), 102 Stat. 4669 (1988).  
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adopted a flat one-year limit and thereby created a provision 
simultaneously underinclusive and overinclusive. The 
provision is underinclusive because it does not apply to removal 
based on arising-under jurisdiction even if the state court has 
made substantial progress in the case; the provision is also 
overinclusive by preventing diversity-based removal after one 
year even in those cases where no substantial progress has 
been made in state court. As a court reviewing one such case 
observed, “It is very difficult to see how a removal under the 
facts of this case can interfere with the state court proceedings 
when none have occurred because of plaintiffs’ decision to 
withhold service until the one year time limitation has 
expired.”146  
With respect to the competing jurisdictional versus 
procedural interpretations applicable to the one-year 
limitation, a jurisdictional approach to the one-year limit 
serves to bar outright any attempt to remove after one year.147 
Such an approach results when courts apply a strict statutory 
construction to the removal statutes—a construction that, as 
we have seen, exalts the plaintiff-deference policy over the 
defendant’s statutory right to remove. This jurisdictional 
approach is far from uniform, however, with a number of courts 
concluding that the one-year limit is procedural and thus 
potentially subject to equitable considerations.148 Indeed, dicta 
  
 146 Martine v. Nat’l Tea Co., 837 F. Supp. 749, 750 (M.D. La. 1993).  
 147 See Caudill v. Ford Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1328 (N.D. Okla. 
2003) (concluding that statutory language was clear and refusing to “create” 
jurisdiction beyond the one-year period); Mantz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 
Civ. A. 2:03-0506, 2003 WL 21383830, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. June 13, 2003) (concluding 
that the “plain language of the statute . . . . ‘erect[s] an absolute bar to removal’” 
(quoting Lovern v. GMC, 121 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1997))); Rashid v. Schenck Constr. 
Co., 843 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (one-year limit divests the court of 
jurisdiction); Brock v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 721, 723 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) 
(ability to remove lapses after one year), aff’d, 7 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1993). Recent 
Supreme Court decisions have expressed a strong preference for finding rules to be 
nonjurisdictional unless they govern “a court’s adjudicatory capacity, that is, its 
subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. . . . Other rules, even if important and 
mandatory, we have said, should not be given the jurisdictional brand.” Henderson ex 
rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202-03 (2011) (citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. 
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243-44 (2010); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of 
Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584, 596 (2009)). 
 148 See Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(one-year limit is procedural, not jurisdictional, and thus can be waived); see also Tedford 
v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 2003) (court may consider parties’ 
conduct in determining whether it is equitable to apply the one-year limit strictly); id. at 
426 n.4 (citing cases concluding that the one-year limit was subject to equitable 
exceptions); Wise v. Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc., No. Civ. JFM-02-2323, 2002 WL 
2001529, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2002) (finding that plaintiff had “engaged in ‘forum 
manipulation’ in an effort to defeat the defendant’s removal right,” and stating, “[i]t 
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in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis decision 
referring to the one-year provision as “nonjurisdictional”149 
suggest that the Court viewed the one-year limit as 
procedural.150 Perhaps an even more interesting issue is 
whether the one-year limit applies both to cases initially 
removable and those not initially removable. 
A fuller excerpt from section 1446(b) aids in 
understanding the debate between applying the one-year limit 
to all cases or only those that were not initially removable. In 
its entirety, section 1446(b) provides:  
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed 
within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service 
or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim 
upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days 
after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial 
pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served 
on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.  
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of 
removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the 
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended 
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be 
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable, 
except that a case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction 
conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after 
commencement of the action.151  
The one-year limitation for diversity-based removals 
appears as the final clause of the second paragraph above. By 
appearing in this particular place within the statute, the one-
year limitation seems to act as a modifying or qualifying 
phrase only with respect to the second paragraph of section 
1446(b), and some courts have therefore applied it only to cases 
that initially were nonremovable.152 However, other courts have 
  
would be disrespectful to Congress to conclude that it contemplated that a litigant’s right 
to a federal forum could be defeated simply by an adverse party employing the strategem 
of secreting the federal nature of a claim by failing to claim before the one-year limit 
established by § 1446(b) the true amount of damages she is seeking”).  
 149 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 n.13 (1996); see also Henderson ex 
rel. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202-03 (noting that rules other than those governing a 
court’s subject-matter or personal jurisdiction should be deemed nonjurisdictional); Reed 
Elsevier, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 1243-44 (same); Union Pac. R.R. Co., 130 S. Ct. at 596 (same). 
 150 See Caterpillar, Inc., 519 U.S. at 75 n.13 (referring to the one-year 
provision as “nonjurisdictional”). 
 151 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006).  
 152 See, e.g., Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 534-
35 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that if Congress had intended the one-year limit to apply 
to all diversity-based removals it would have stated so more clearly). 
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applied the one-year limit to all diversity-based removals, 
thereby interpreting the limitation to apply both to initially 
removable cases as well as to those that were not initially 
removable.153 The courts that have offered this interpretation 
have emphasized that they must strictly construe the removal 
statutes against removal—an approach, as we have seen, used 
to accord deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum over the 
defendant’s right to remove.154  
With the competing policies of the plaintiff’s right to 
forum selection and the defendant’s right to remove to federal 
court now more fully revealed, we can now set out a framework 
that will generate a more consistent approach to the complex 
set of issues generated by removal involving section 1446(b).  
IV. TOWARD A MORE CONSISTENT CONSTRUCTION OF 
SECTION 1446(b)  
This article has examined three contradictory provisions 
within section 1446(b), two implied and one express, that arise 
within the removal context: the first-served/last-
served/intermediate rules, the voluntary-involuntary rule, and 
the one-year limitation on diversity-based removal. A key 
insight into the resolution of these issues, whether by the 
courts or by Congress, is recognizing that the debates are not 
simply disputes over removal doctrine, but reflect the 
underlying tension in American procedure between plaintiff 
choices and defendant responses. In this part, we will analyze 
and synthesize the issues raised by these provisions in order to 
set out a more consistent analytical framework for considering 
late-arising removal efforts.  
A. Underlying Policies  
We begin with a review of policies, again both express and 
implied, that underlie and motivate these provisions. There are at 
least six such policies: (1) the statutory language itself, in its 
provision for removal by defendants as a general matter and in its 
more specific provisions of a thirty-day window for removal and of 
the one-year limitation on diversity-based removal; (2) the axiom 
  
 153 See Rezendes v. Dow Corning Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1435, 1437 (E.D. Cal. 1989). 
 154 To the extent that one might question whether the one-year limitation 
negatively impacts defendants, one need only look to the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, which was heavily promoted by defendant interests and resulted in eliminating 
the one-year rule in certain class actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453. 
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that courts should interpret the removal statutes strictly; (3) the 
judicially imposed rule of unanimity; (4) the promotion of judicial 
economy; (5) deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; and (6) an 
apparent disfavor of diversity jurisdiction. These policies reflect at 
least three inherent contradictions critical to the construction of a 
more consistent framework.  
First, the policies mix deference to the plaintiff’s choice 
of forum with the defendant’s statutory entitlement to removal. 
Second, the policies mix strict statutory construction principles 
with the addition of judicially created conditions and rules. 
Third, the policies mix an articulated goal of judicial economy 
with the potential for removing cases to a new federal forum 
after they have long lingered in a state forum. Our next step is 
to ask whether any of these contradictions yields ready 
answers or contributes to a potential analytical framework.  
The mix of strict statutory construction with judicially 
created conditions and rules is a somewhat common situation155 
without a ready solution, because it does not necessarily 
require compromise. Instead, courts and legislators could 
pursue a range of possible options. Courts could strictly 
construe the removal statutes and prohibit any 
supplementation with judicially created conditions and rules. 
Alternatively, they could honor any number of judicially 
created rules in addition to, or in explication of, the statutory 
language. In light of the current prevalence of a “plain 
language” approach to statutory construction, and for the sake 
of clarity, Congress could amend section 1446(b) to include any 
desired judicially created rules expressly and mandate that any 
rules not so included are expressly rejected.  
The mix of judicial-economy concerns with the potential 
for late removal similarly does not yield any ready resolution: 
some sort of compromise appears required, yet the strength of 
these competing interests yields a range of choices. This leaves 
the mix of deference to the plaintiff’s forum choice with the 
defendant’s right to remove.  
  
 155 See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908) 
(creating “well pleaded complaint” rule in federal arising-under cases, despite the 
absence of any such express requirement in the federal arising-under statute); Chi., 
Rock Island, & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900) (reaffirming “rule of 
unanimity” when defendants seek to remove a civil action from state to federal court, 
despite the absence of any such express requirement in the federal removal statute); 
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (creating “complete diversity” 
rule in federal diversity jurisdiction cases, despite the absence of any such express 
requirement in the federal diversity statute). 
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In examining the conflict between preserving the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum and honoring the defendant’s right to 
remove to federal court when the statutory preconditions are 
satisfied (which also implicates interpreting the removal 
statutes strictly), compromise is an absolute necessity. If the 
policy of deferring to the plaintiff’s forum choice was not 
subject to compromise, then the plaintiff’s forum choice would 
become absolute and the removal statutes would serve no 
purpose—deferring to the plaintiff’s choice of forum would, 
absent compromise, constitute both the beginning and the end 
of the discussion and would displace any potential for removal. 
Accordingly, courts must recognize the axiom regarding 
deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum for what it is—a 
starting point but not the only point of consideration. The 
defendant’s right of removal is exactly that—a right, so long as 
the defendant satisfies the statutory prerequisites. A 1907 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision stated this plainly and directly:  
[T]he Federal courts may, and should, take such action as will defeat 
attempts to wrongfully deprive parties entitled to sue in Federal 
courts of the protection of their rights in those tribunals. . . . Federal 
courts should not sanction devices intended to prevent a removal to a 
Federal court where one has that right.156 
Some cases have expressly articulated a mistaken belief 
that the plaintiff’s choice of forum should trump the 
defendant’s statutory right of removal.157 Those cases stand in 
stark contrast to other, older case decisions clearly stating that 
a defendant’s right of removal is equal in stature, and of the 
same constitutional dimension, as a plaintiff’s right to select a 
forum.158 As the Supreme Court has said, to allow plaintiffs to 
  
 156 Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 182-83, 186 
(1907). 
 157 See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 219 n.11 (5th Cir. 
1998) (“The defendant’s right to remove and the plaintiff’s right to choose the forum are 
not equal.”), rev’d, 526 U.S. 574 (1999); Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 167 F. Supp. 
2d 1066, 1069 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (“The plaintiff’s right to choose his forum is superior to 
the defendant’s right of removal.”). 
 158 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816). 
The constitution of the United States was designed for the common and equal 
benefit of all the people of the United States. The judicial power was granted 
for the same benign and salutary purposes. It was not to be exercised 
exclusively for the benefit of parties who might be plaintiffs, and would elect 
the national forum, but also for the protection of defendants who might be 
entitled to try their rights, or assert their privileges, before the same forum. 
Id. at 348; see also Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cody, 166 U.S. 606, 609 (1897) (referring to 
“defendant’s constitutional right as a citizen of a different State than the plaintiff, to 
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“always elect the state court” renders the protection of diversity 
jurisdiction ineffective for defendants and “[s]uch a state of 
things can, in no respect, be considered as giving equal 
rights.”159 Rather, Congress authorized removal so that 
defendants would not be “deprived of all the security which the 
constitution intended in aid of [their] rights.”160 By virtue of the 
fact that a defendant cannot automatically thwart the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum in every instance but instead can 
remove only under the circumstances prescribed by statute, the 
removal statutes constitute a congressional compromise 
between the interests of plaintiffs and defendants. It remains 
to apply this framework to resolve the issues that arise in the 
context of statutory construction—and accordingly, the next 
question becomes the extent to which a strict statutory 
construction should be modified by judicially created conditions 
and rules, which brings us full circle. At this point, a return to 
each of the three identified removal issues will provide the 
context necessary for our framework.  
B. Applying Policies to the Rules  
This section applies the policies identified above and 
illustrates how these policies impact each of the rules explored.  
1. The First-Served, Last-Served, and Intermediate 
Rules  
Returning first to the first-served, last-served, and 
intermediate rules, and assuming that the rule of unanimity is 
here to stay, the question becomes which of the three 
approaches strikes the better compromise between deferring to 
the plaintiff’s choice of forum and the defendant’s right to 
removal. The conclusion appears straightforward: the last-
served defendant rule honors both the plaintiff’s right of forum 
selection and the defendant’s right of removal. Although some 
courts have claimed that the first-served rule does no injustice 
to defendants due to the rule of unanimity,161 the first-served 
  
choose a federal forum”); Boatmen’s Bank of St. Louis v. Fritzlen, 135 F. 650, 655 (8th 
Cir. 1905) (stating that a defendant’s right of removal “is of sufficient value and gravity 
to be guarantied by the Constitution and the acts of Congress”); In re Diet Drugs Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 414, 425 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (stating that a defendant’s right 
of removal “emanates from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution”).  
 159 Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 349.  
 160 Id.  
 161 See, e.g., Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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rule is susceptible to potential manipulation: the plaintiff 
might serve less sophisticated defendants first in an attempt to 
preclude removal.162 The last-served rule deprives the plaintiff 
of no valid right or privilege—the plaintiff loses only the ability 
to manipulate the timing of service so as to potentially reduce 
the likelihood of removal—whereas the first-served rule 
potentially deprives later-served defendants of their right to 
removal. Accordingly, the last-served defendant rule appears to 
offer the better compromise.163  
2. The Voluntary-Involuntary Rule  
The voluntary-involuntary rule presents the 
contradiction between deferring to the plaintiff’s choice of 
forum and the defendant’s right to removal in a very direct 
manner. Remember that deference to the plaintiff’s choice of 
forum is the Supreme Court’s sole articulated justification for 
the voluntary-involuntary rule.164 But it is unclear why 
deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum should trump the 
defendant’s right to remove in the context of a subsequent 
change in circumstances.165  
Although the plaintiff is said to be the master of her 
claim,166 no obvious reason explains why the plaintiff should 
maintain ongoing control after filing the complaint, especially 
when such ongoing control implicates concerns that a plaintiff 
could manipulate amendments and dismissals in such a 
manner as to defeat the defendant’s right to removal. The 
  
 162 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (providing examples). 
 163 See Howard B. Stravitz, Recocking the Removal Trigger, 53 S.C. L. REV. 
185, 202 (2002) (opining that it “is undoubtedly correct that the first-served defendant 
rule unfairly shifts [the] balance in favor of plaintiffs”); see also McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. 
of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 927-28 (4th Cir. 1992) (“‘Congress created the 
removal process to protect defendants. It did not extend such protection with one hand, 
and with the other give plaintiffs a bag of tricks to overcome it.’” (quoting McKinney v. 
Bd. of Trs. of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 713 F. Supp. 185, 189 (W.D.N.C. 1989))).  
 164 See Jenkins v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pa., 650 F. Supp. 609, 613-14 
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (“What emerges from an examination of the Supreme Court cases on 
the voluntary-involuntary rule is the conclusion that the rule is not based upon an 
appealability/finality rationale but upon a policy favoring the plaintiff’s ‘power to 
determine the removability of his case.’” (quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 
U.S. 276, 282 (1918)). 
 165 See Underwood, supra note 104, at 1098 (“The voluntary/ involuntary rule 
is not just antiquated, but lacking any principled bases. It acts as merely another 
court-created doctrine designed to limit the ability of litigants to utilize the services of 
the federal tribunals, trampling on principles of federalism.”).  
 166 See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 
831 (2002) (referring to plaintiff as “the master of the complaint” (quoting Caterpillar 
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1996))). 
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plaintiff is entitled to the initial forum choice and permitted to 
attempt to structure her lawsuit in such a manner as to avoid 
federal subject-matter jurisdiction, such as by suing under state 
law rather than federal law, suing nondiverse defendants, or 
limiting the recovery sought to one below the jurisdictional 
threshold. However, the extreme deference to the plaintiff’s 
choice of forum reflected in the voluntary-involuntary rule seems 
especially incongruous in light of other ways that we permit 
defendants to alter the litigation, such as by adding parties,167 
asserting counterclaims and cross-claims,168 and moving for 
transfers of venue.169 Extending the plaintiff’s control beyond the 
initial filing, so that defendants cannot exercise their right of 
removal in an instance where federal subject-matter jurisdiction 
plainly exists, unduly defers to the plaintiff’s forum selection at 
the expense of the defendant’s right of removal.  
3. The One-Year Limitation  
Finally, we turn to the one-year limitation on diversity-
based removal. As an initial matter, no obvious rationale 
explains the purpose of imposing an outer one-year time limit on 
the removal of diversity cases, but no outer time limit 
whatsoever on the removal of arising-under cases. This presents 
two potential options: eliminating the one-year limitation on 
diversity-based removal so that there is no time limit for either 
diversity or arising-under cases, or imposing an outer time 
limitation on both diversity and arising-under removal.  
In answer to concerns about the one-year limitation as 
tending to encourage plaintiff manipulation (such as waiting 
until the expiration of the one-year limit before dismissing a 
nondiverse defendant), the elimination of the one-year limit 
would remove this concern and put all bases for removal on the 
same footing. However, the lack of any outer time limit would 
permit removal after state courts have potentially invested 
substantial time and resources in the case, which is 
inconsistent with judicial-economy concerns. An appropriate 
compromise in this instance might be for Congress to 
implement an outer time limitation for all removal, regardless 
of whether the basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction is 
diversity or arising-under. This would eliminate the apparent 
  
 167 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 14. 
 168 See FED. R. CIV. P. 13. 
 169 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006). 
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bias against diversity jurisdiction, would address the 
articulated concern about removal after state courts have made 
substantial investments in the case, and would resolve the 
current dispute as to whether the time limit applies to all cases 
or only to those not initially removable. Further, Congress 
could specify that the time limitation is subject to equitable 
considerations. This would eliminate the current dispute about 
whether the provision is jurisdictional or procedural; it would 
also serve to clarify that courts will not look favorably upon the 
perpetrators of strategic manipulation (e.g., failure to 
investigate by defendants, or delays in serving defendants or 
amending pleadings by plaintiffs). Importantly, Congress, as 
the creator of the statutory limitation on diversity-based 
removal, must make the choice about applicable amendments 
to current removal provisions.  
CONCLUSION  
When removal from state to federal court is delayed 
beyond the initial thirty days after the action is commenced, 
such subsequently instituted removal potentially implicates 
three complicating issues that are all rooted in section 1446(b): 
the first-served/last-served/intermediate rules, the voluntary-
involuntary rule, and the one-year limitation on diversity-
based removal. These three issues have developed 
independently, which has masked the potential for a unifying 
analytical framework. This article has identified the 
underlying policies, analyzed the inherent contradictions, and 
proposed resolutions more consistent with the dual and equal 
goals of honoring the plaintiff’s choice of forum and honoring 
the defendant’s right of removal. 
